Testimony of

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Before the House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Regarding

Energy Speculation: Is Greater Regulation Necessary to
Stop Price Manipulation? – Part II

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One Page Summary of Testimony

In the face of the American consumer buckling under skyrocketing oil prices, much of the U.S. financial sector determining the price of that oil has escaped meaningful U.S. regulatory oversight.

Over 30% of the U.S. delivered futures benchmark largely determinant of the price of oil here and throughout the world is now being traded on an exchange headquartered in Atlanta, with trading engines in Chicago and trading terminals placed all over the U.S. Relying on an outdated 1999 CFTC staff no action letter granted to a now defunct U.K. subsidiary, the U.S. owned Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and the CFTC assert that United Kingdom regulators, rather than the U.S. CFTC, should have primary oversight of that exchange. CFTC permission has now also been granted to the Dubai Mercantile Exchange, in partnership with U.S. owned NYMEX, to begin trading that same U.S. delivered contract in the U.S. under the regulatory oversight of the Dubai government, creating the “London/Dubai” Loophole for U.S. speculation.

An ever burgeoning unregulated energy “swaps” market has developed in the U.S. freed from CFTC oversight by the so-called statutory Enron Loophole. Those swaps dealers are laying off their risk from unregulated swaps markets on U.S. regulated exchanges which are treating those dealers, e.g., investment banks, as if they were “physical” commercial hedgers not subject to speculation controls, thereby creating the “Swaps Dealers” Loophole.

The CFTC has within the last week made feints toward closing these exemptions, but it is moving slowly and ineffectively. For example, under intense pressure from Congress, it “negotiated” last week with the U.K. to receive permission to require the U.S. owned ICE to place limits on speculation and provide large trader reporting data pertaining to U.S. delivered crude oil contracts traded on its U.S. trading terminals. However, ICE has been given until September 15, 2008 to comply, a virtual lifetime to the distressed U.S. gas consumer.

In response to CFTC actions, a leading U.K. financial spokesperson called the CFTC’s actions “American Imperialism,” saying “if a bunch of [S]enators want to get rude about the [UK], that’s fine, but don’t interfere in our market.” The U.K.’s FSA now refuses to dismiss the rumor that it will “veto” the CFTC action.

In fact, the CFTC has outsourced oversight of “our” own U.S. oil markets to the U.K., rather than vice versa, as the U.K. now suggests. We have outsourced to a U.K. agency that has not brought a single energy futures enforcement action in its existence, and has only two supervisors monitoring almost 50% of the world’s future trades.

If the 2008 PUMP Act becomes law, the U.S. consumer will know precisely the role speculation plays in the massive run up of gasoline, because that statute closes all three major speculation loopholes and brings all U.S. energy futures trading done in and affecting U.S. delivered energy products into the light of day. The only imposition required of speculators is that their trading must be observed by U.S. regulators. Indeed, the 2008 PUMP Act creates a new “U.S. energy consumers” loophole to the massive unpoliced speculation unhinging the market price of oil from its economic bearings.
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Introduction

My name is Michael Greenberger.

I want to thank the subcommittee for inviting me to testify on the important issue that is the subject of today’s hearings.

After 25 years in private legal practice, I served as the Director of the Division of Trading and Markets (“T&M”) at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) from September 1997 to September 1999. In that capacity, I supervised approximately 135 CFTC personnel in CFTC offices in DC, New York, Chicago, and Minneapolis, including lawyers and accountants who were engaged in overseeing the Nation’s futures exchanges. During my tenure at the CFTC, I worked extensively on, inter alia, regulatory issues concerning exchange traded energy derivatives, the legal status of over-the-counter (“OTC”) energy derivatives, and the CFTC authorization of trading of foreign exchange derivative products on computer terminals in the United States.

While at the CFTC, I also served on the Steering Committee of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (“PWG”). In that capacity, I drafted, or oversaw the drafting of, portions of the April 1999 PWG Report entitled “Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management,” which recommended to Congress regulatory actions to be taken in the wake of the near collapse of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund, including Appendix C to that report which outlined the CFTC’s role in responding to that near collapse. As a member of the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (“IOSCO”) Hedge Fund Task Force, I also participated in the drafting of the November 1999 report of IOSCO’s Technical Committee relating to the LTCM episode: “Hedge Funds and Other Highly Leveraged Institutions.”

After a two year stint between 1999 and 2001 as the Principal Deputy Associate Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice, I began service as a Professor at the University of Maryland School of Law. At the law school, I have, inter alia, focused my attention on futures and OTC derivatives trading, including academic writing and speaking on these subjects. I currently teach a course that I designed entitled “Futures, Options, and Derivatives,” in which the United States energy futures trading markets are featured as a case study of the way in which unregulated or poorly regulated futures and derivatives trading cause dysfunctions within those markets and within the U.S. economy as a whole. One result of this dysfunction, as I describe to my students, is the needlessly high prices which energy consumers now pay because of the probability of excessive speculation, illegal manipulation, and fraud within those markets.

The question whether there has been manipulation of U.S. energy futures markets in general, and U.S. delivered crude oil contracts specifically, has been the subject of many hearings. I have previously testified at four of those hearings, the most recent held on June 3, 2008 before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology. To put the issue of today’s hearing in context, I summarize and update the points I made at that hearing immediately below.
Summary and Update of Prior Testimony

One of the fundamental purposes of futures contracts is to provide price discovery in the “cash” or “spot” markets. Those selling or buying commodities in the “spot” markets rely on futures prices to judge amounts to charge or pay for the delivery of a commodity. Since their creation in the agricultural context decades ago, it has been widely understood that, unless properly regulated, futures markets are easily subject to distorting the economic fundamentals of price discovery (i.e., cause the paying of unnecessarily higher or lower prices) through excessive speculation, fraud, or manipulation.

The Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) has long been judged to prevent those abuses. Accordingly, prior to the hasty and last minute passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”), “all futures activity [was] confined by law (and eventually to criminal activity) to [CFTC regulated] exchanges alone.” At the behest of Enron, the CFMA authorized the “stunning” change to the CEA to allow the option of trading energy commodities on deregulated “exempt commercial markets,” i.e., exchanges exempt from CFTC, or any other federal or state, oversight, thereby rejecting the contrary 1999 advice of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, which included the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and the Chairmen of the SEC and CFTC. This is called the “Enron Loophole.”

Two prominent and detailed bipartisan studies by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations’ (“PSI”) staff represent what is now conventional wisdom: hedge funds, large banks, pension funds, insurance and energy companies, and wealthy individuals have used “exempt commercial energy futures markets” to drive up needlessly the price of energy commodities over what economic fundamentals dictate, adding, for example, what the PSI estimated to be @ $20-$30 per barrel to the price of a barrel of crude oil. At the time of that estimate, the price of crude oil had reached a then record high of $77. The conclusion that speculation has added a large premium to energy products has been corroborated by many experts, including most recently and most

2 See, e.g., Jonathan Ira Levy, Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the Problem of Commodity Exchange in the United States, 1875-1905, AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 307 (2006) (“[T]he man who managed or sold or owned those immense wheat fields has not as much to say with the regard to the price of the wheat that some young fellow who stands howling around the Chicago wheat pit could actually sell in a day.”)(quoting Fictitious Dealings in Agricultural Products: House Comm. on Agric. Committee Hearing Reports (1892)).
4 Id.; see also PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 16 (1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/otcact.pdf (last visited June 21, 2008) (“Due to the characteristics of markets for non-financial commodities with finite supplies, however, the Working Group is unanimously recommending that the exclusion [from regulation] not be extended to agreements involving such commodities.”).
6 June 2006 Report, supra note 5, at 2, 23.
prominently, George Soros, the International Monetary Fund, OPEC, and the International Energy Agency.

The PSI staff and others have identified the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) of Atlanta, Georgia, as an unregulated facility upon which considerable exempt energy futures trading is done. For purposes of facilitating exempt natural gas futures, ICE is deemed a U.S. “exempt commercial market” under the Enron Loophole. For purposes of its facilitating U.S. WTI crude oil futures, the CFTC, by informal staff action, has deemed ICE to be a U.K. entity not subject to direct CFTC regulation even though ICE maintains U.S. headquarters and trading infrastructure, facilitating, inter

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8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA 27-28 (2008) (“Producers and many analysts say it is speculative activity that is pushing up oil prices now. Producers in particular argument that fundamentals would yield an oil price of about US $80 a barrel, with the rest being the result of speculative activity.”); see also Neil King Jr., Saudi Arabia's Leverage In Oil Market Is Sapped, WALL STREET J. (June 16, 2008), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121355902769475555.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (last visited June 21, 2008) (quoting Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi as saying skyrocketing oil prices were “unjustified by the fundamentals” of supply and demand).

9 In a rare move representatives of the world’s largest oil producers and consumers have issued a joint working paper in advance of a joint summit on oil prices yesterday, which calls for worldwide regulation to “tackle issues” and to “improve the transparency and regulation of financial markets though measures to capture more data on index fund activity and to examine cross exchange inter-actions in the crude market.” Bernd Radowitz & Reem Shamseddine, Oil Summit to Take on Speculators, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2008), available at http://www.moneyweb.co.za/mw/view/mw/en/page94?oid=211868&sn=Detail (last visited June 22, 2008).

10 See June 2007 Report, supra note 5, at 27.

11 See id.
alia, @ 30% of trades in U.S. WTI futures. The Dubai Mercantile Exchange, in affiliation with NYMEX, a U.S. exchange, has also been granted permission to trade the U.S. delivered WTI contract on U.S. terminals, but is, by virtue of a CFTC no-action letter, to be regulated by the Dubai Financial Service Authority (“DFSA”). NYMEX itself, the U.S. premier regulated energy futures contract market, is reported to be planning to have a London trading platform registered with the U.K.’s FSA, after which it would apply for the foreign board of trade no action relief that has already been granted to ICE and DME. Providing NYMEX’s London trading platform with this kind of no action relief would convert full U.S. regulation of the most important crude oil futures contracts to substantial U.K. oversight. These staff informal action letters, effectuating the exemptions for “foreign” owned U.S. trading terminals, by their own terms make it clear that they may be instantly revoked by the CFTC.

One final gap in the oversight of speculation in the U.S. crude oil (and agricultural) markets was illuminated by the testimony of Michael W. Masters, Managing Member of Masters Capital Management, LLC, at a recent May 20 hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs. Mr. Masters demonstrated that large financial institutions, such as investment banks and hedge funds, which were “hedging” their off exchange futures transactions on energy and agricultural prices on U.S. regulated exchanges, were remarkably being treated by NYMEX, for example, and the CFTC as “commercial interests,” rather than as the speculators they self evidently are. By lumping large financial institutions with traditional commercial oil dealers (or farmers) even fully regulated U.S. exchanges were not applying traditional speculation limits to the transactions engaged in by these speculative interests. Mr. Masters demonstrated beyond all doubt that a significant percentage of the trades in WTI futures, for example, were controlled by non-commercial interests. These exemptions from speculation limits for large financial institutions hedging off-exchange “swaps” transactions emanates from a CFTC letter issued on October 8, 1991 and have continued through last week.

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14 Jeremy Grant, Nymex's Long Road to the Electronic Age, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 17, 2006), at 39 (“Nymex has indicated that it might be forced to move its electronically traded WTI to London so that it can compete on a level playing field with ICE.”).
15 See Greenberger, supra note 1, at 11-12 (providing a complete discussion of the no-action letter process including termination).
17 Id. at 7-8.
18 Gene Epstein, Commodities: Who’s Behind The Boom?, BARRON’S 32 (March 31, 2008) (“The speculators, now so bullish, are mainly the index funds. . . . By using the [swaps dealers] as a conduit, the index funds get an exemption from position limits that are normally imposed on any other speculator, including the $1 in every $10 of index-fund money that does not go through the swaps dealers.”)
20 Id. at 8, 11.
Virtually all parties now agree the Enron, London/Dubai, and Swaps Dealers Loopholes must be closed. On June 18, 2008, the Food Conservation and Energy Act of 2008\textsuperscript{22} (the “Farm Bill”) was enacted into law by a Congressional override of President Bush’s veto. Title XIII of the Farm Bill is the CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008, which, in turn, includes a provision that was intended to “close” the Enron Loophole.\textsuperscript{23} The provisions, however, did not return to the status quo prior to the passage of the Enron Loophole by bringing all energy futures contracts within the full U.S. regulatory format. Instead, the Farm Bill amendment requires the CFTC and the public to prove on a case-by-case basis through administrative proceedings that an individual energy contract should be regulated if the CFTC can prove that the contract “serve[s] a significant price discovery function” in order to detect and prevent “manipulation.”\textsuperscript{24}

It has also been widely reported that the CFTC intends to use the new legislation to demonstrate that only a single unregulated natural gas futures contract, and not any crude oil futures contracts, should be removed from the Enron Loophole and become fully regulated. Thus, by CFTC pronouncement, crude oil, gasoline, and heating oil futures contracts will not be covered by the new legislation.

The CFTC has also made it clear that the Farm Bill amendment will not cover any U.S. delivered futures contracts traded on the U.S. terminals of foreign exchanges operating pursuant to staff no action letters. As mentioned above, the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) of Atlanta, Georgia, for purposes of facilitating U.S. delivered WTI crude oil futures, is deemed by the CFTC, through an informal staff no action letter, to be a U.K. entity not subject to direct CFTC regulation even though ICE maintains U.S. headquarters and trading infrastructure, facilitating, \textit{inter alia}, @ 30\% of trades in U.S. WTI futures. Moreover, the Dubai Mercantile Exchange (“DME”), in affiliation with NYMEX, a U.S. exchange, has also been granted permission to trade the U.S. delivered WTI contract on U.S. terminals, but is, by virtue of a CFTC no action letter, regulated by the Dubai Financial Service Authority (“DFSA”). Again, the CFTC will not rely on the plain language of the Farm Bill amendment to close the “London/Dubai” Loophole.

The “Swaps Dealer” Loophole was only recently brought to the attention of Congress and thus was not addressed by the Farm Bill amendment.

\textbf{The 2008 PUMP Act Fully and Effectively Closes All Trading Loopholes for Speculators}

On June 20, 2008, the Chairman of this Subcommittee, Congressman Bart Stupak, announced the introduction of the Prevent Unfair Manipulation of Prices Act of 2008 (“2008 PUMP Act”).\textsuperscript{25} The 2008 PUMP Act completely closes the Enron, London/Dubai, and Swaps Dealers Loopholes, requiring all U.S.-delivered futures energy transactions executed in any manner within the U.S. to be traded on U.S. contract markets subject to direct regulation by the CFTC.

\textsuperscript{23} Id.
\textsuperscript{24} Id.
**Completely Closes the Enron Loophole.** First, the 2008 PUMP Act would completely reverse the CEA’s exemption of energy commodities from U.S. exchange trading requirements. The amendment would redefine an “exempt commodity” as a commodity that does not include an agricultural or “energy commodity,” thereby bringing all energy futures within the CEA’s exchange trading requirement. An energy commodity would include, *inter alia*, crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, propane, electricity, and natural gas. Under the 2008 PUMP Act, an “included energy transaction” must be fully within CFTC direct supervision pursuant to statutory contract market requirements if the transaction relates to the delivery of U.S. energy futures contracts or if an energy futures trade is conducted on a computer terminal in the U.S. Conversely, energy futures transactions made through terminals outside the U.S. to deliver a futures energy contract outside the U.S. would be exempt from U.S. contract market regulation.

**Makes Clear Energy Swaps Are Futures.** The 2008 PUMP Act expressly bars over-the-counter (i.e., trading outside of a regulated U.S. contract market) energy futures “swaps” involving transactions of futures energy contracts to be delivered in the U.S. or conducted using computer terminals in the U.S. The combination of statutorily eliminating over the counter energy swaps transactions and requiring that all energy futures contracts delivered or traded in the U.S. be on exchange makes doubly clear that energy futures index funds can only be traded on a U.S. regulated and CFTC overseen U.S. contract market.

**Requires Transparency for Energy Index Funds.** The 2008 PUMP Act also would require the CFTC to make on its website monthly postings about aggregate numbers and positions of anyone using index funds to trade U.S.-delivered futures energy contracts or trade on U.S. computer terminals.

**Nullifies FBOT No Action Letters.** The 2008 PUMP Act would nullify all no actions letters previously granted to exchanges trading futures energy contracts to be delivered in the U.S. or using computer terminals in the U.S. A foreign exchange desiring to trade energy futures on U.S. terminals would have to register as a U.S. regulated contract market. The Amendment would provide a six-month grace period for compliance.

Accordingly, the 2008 PUMP Act would require that U.S. energy futures or energy futures traded on U.S. terminals be subject to the essential “core principles” of regulation of U.S. contract markets; each of these core principles are designed to prevent fraud, manipulation and excessive speculation.

These regulatory requirements include: imposition of mandatory speculation limits; regular and reliable large trader reporting to detect immediately excessive speculation, manipulation or fraud; strong contract market self-regulation surveillance systems; and provision

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26 Id. at § 2(a).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See id. at § 2(c).
30 Id. at § 2(b).
31 Id. at § 2(i).
32 Id. at § 2(e)(2).
33 Id.
34 Id.
for strong CFTC emergency intervention authority to resolve dysfunctions within the energy futures markets. Most of those protections are either not provided for or are not emphasized in the foreign regulatory regimes to which the CFTC has given deference in the no action process. The 2008 PUMP Act would, accordingly, eliminate in the case of ICE, for example, the need to rely on a regulator in London, using less rigorous oversight of the markets, for activity directly and significantly impacting U.S. energy markets, i.e., the trading of over 30% of the critically important U.S. WTI petroleum futures contract.

**Strengthens Regulated U.S. Exchange Trading of Energy Futures.** But, even more important, the 2008 PUMP Act strengthens those regulatory requirements that now apply to CFTC regulated contract markets engaged in energy futures trading.

**Aggregated Speculation Limits.** For example, the 2008 PUMP Act requires the CFTC to establish uniform speculation limits for transactions involving U.S.-delivered energy contracts futures or those traded on computer terminals in the U.S. The Commission is required to “fix limits on the aggregate number of positions which may be held by any person” for each month and in all markets under CFTC jurisdiction. Under the exiting regulatory regime, speculation limits are only applied by each contract market, and “aggregate positions” are never imposed. This position limit would prevent a trader from spreading speculation over a host of markets, thereby accumulating a disproportionately large share of an energy market while satisfying each exchange’s separate limits.

On the other hand, the 2008 PUMP Act would exempt “bona fide hedging transactions” involving U.S.-delivered futures energy contracts or those traded on computer terminals in the U.S. In short, speculation limits would only apply to speculators—not those using the markets to hedge risks involved in selling or buying the energy commodity at issue in the wholesale or retail markets.

**Provides Clear Oversight of Bilateral Energy Transactions.** The 2008 PUMP Act also would provide special rules for “bilateral included energy transactions,” or transactions involving U.S.-delivered futures energy contracts not made through a trading facility. Such bilateral included energy transactions would consist of transactions between two principals, which do not involve communication or negotiation about any of the material economic terms of an energy futures contract. While a source of great concern by industrial users of the energy futures markets for their abusive speculative impact on the markets, these bilateral transactions were not regulated by the Farm Bill amendment. The Stupak legislation would require “eligible contract participants” to provide the CFTC with market data about large trading positions.

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36 For a full discussion of the importance of CFTC emergency powers and self regulatory requirements, see text accompanying notes 118-128 infra. Neither the CFTC’s new requirements for FBOTs nor any other proposed legislation would afford CFTC emergency oversight of, and self regulation and surveillance on, FBOTs with U.S. trading terminals.


38 Id. at § 2(g).

39 Id. at § 2(h).

involving principal to principal standardized contracts relating to an energy commodity.\textsuperscript{41} Additionally, the CFTC and Department of Justice are given the authority to examine the trading records of “an eligible contract participant that enters into or executes a bilateral included energy transaction.”\textsuperscript{42} The 2008 PUMP Act should be revised to make it clear that even those standardized bilateral transactions not traded by computer must be traded on a U.S. regulated exchange, because they are properly considered futures contracts however traded.

\textbf{Provides Strong Oversight of CFTC Exemption Authority.} Finally, the 2008 PUMP Act recognizes that the CFTC has, through section 4(c) of the CEA,\textsuperscript{43} the power to tailor U.S. futures regulations from “one size fits all” rules by granting exemptions from statutory requirements so long as the exempted trading comes with assurances that there will be no fraud, manipulation, or excessive speculation and that it otherwise serves the public interest. However, to avoid abusive use of that exemption authority, the 2008 PUMP ACT requires the CFTC to provide Congress with two months notice and to otherwise solicit public comment before promulgating a rule that exempts energy futures transactions governed by the 2008 PUMP Act from the requirements of that statute or the CEA in general.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{Total Impact of the 2008 PUMP Act.} In sum, the 2008 PUMP Act comprehensively closes completely and firmly all of the troublesome loopholes that have been created by the Enron Loophole or by CFTC letter, policy statements, and exemption rules. These deregulatory measures have allowed the U.S. energy futures markets to be overrun by unpolicied speculation, rather than by the commercial interests for which the markets were designed. That uncontrolled speculative activity has unhinged those markets and the price of the underlying commodities from economic fundamentals, and the American consumer has paid an exorbitant speculative premium.

\textbf{Other Supportive Legislation.} It should be noted that there has been legislation introduced in both the House and Senate that are fully consistent with various portions of the 2008 PUMP Act approach. For example, Congressman Van Hollen (D-MD) and Congresswoman DeLauro (D-CT) last week introduced legislation that would completely close the Enron, London/Dubai, and Swaps Dealer Loopholes.\textsuperscript{45} Senators Cantwell (D-WA) and Snowe (R-ME) have introduced legislation directed to the London/Dubai Loophole that would require all trading on U.S. platforms to be governed fully and directly by U.S. futures law.\textsuperscript{46} Senator Nelson (D-FL) has introduced legislation that would close completely the Enron and Swaps Dealer Loophole.\textsuperscript{47}

Senators Lieberman (ID-CT) and Collins (R-ME) have proffered legislation options designed to undercut excessive speculation in these markets through direct and aggregated

\textsuperscript{41} PUMP Act (2008) at § 2(h)(2).
\textsuperscript{42} Id.
\textsuperscript{43} 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2008).
\textsuperscript{44} PUMP Act (2008) at § 2(e)(1).
controls on non-commercial futures traders. One of their proposals would require the CFTC to establish firm and aggregated speculation position limits on all speculative futures trading conducted in the U.S. no matter where the platform on which the trading is geographically located;\(^\text{48}\) they have also suggested an absolute bar on futures trading by financial institutions that exceed certain net worth limits, applying that bar, \textit{inter alia}, to off-exchange index funds.\(^\text{49}\)

**There Are No Legal Restraints to Barring the “Foreign” Impact of Manipulation on U.S. Markets**

Arguments have been advanced that there are legal impediments to the CFTC enforcing U.S. regulatory protections on Foreign Boards of Trade bringing their trading terminals to the U.S. If that argument were correct, it would be an impediment to much that the 2008 PUMP Act and much of the complimentary legislative proposals described above requiring the CFTC to do just that. These arguments are premised upon Section 4 (b) of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), which pertains to the regulation of foreign transactions by United States persons. Section 4 (b) provides in part:

No rule or regulation may be adopted by the Commission under this subsection that (1) requires Commission approval of any contract, rule, regulation, or action of any foreign board of trade, exchange, or market, or clearinghouse for such board of trade, exchange, or market, or (2) governs in any way any rule or contract term or action of any foreign board of trade, exchange, or market, or clearinghouse for such board of trade, exchange, or market.\(^\text{50}\)

However, this clause has been construed only to mean that the CFTC does not have jurisdiction over transactions conducted by \textit{foreign} persons in a \textit{foreign} country on a \textit{foreign} board of trade.\(^\text{51}\) \textit{Kleinberg v. Bear Stearns,}\(^\text{52}\) dealt with a situation where London traders were committing acts of fraud on a London exchange.\(^\text{53}\) In that case, the Court held that the CFTC did not have enforcement jurisdiction, but explained, “It has been consistently held, at least implicitly, that CFTC may regulate and prosecute those who practice fraud in the United States in connection with commodities trading on foreign exchanges.”\(^\text{54}\)

To similar effect is the recent case of \textit{Mak v. Wocom Commodities,}\(^\text{55}\) concerning a Hong Kong resident placing futures trades with the defendant commodity brokers, both of which are Hong Kong corporations (Wocom).\(^\text{56}\) The claims were denied because they were not sufficiently particularized.\(^\text{57}\) However, the court stated that jurisdiction would have been extended if it had


\(^{49}\)Discussion Draft to prohibit the purchase of certain commodity futures contracts and financial instruments and physical commodities by certain investors (2008), available at \url{http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/instinvestlimits.pdf} (last visited June 21, 2008).

\(^{50}\)7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2008).

\(^{51}\)PHILIP McBRIE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION 988 (2004 ed.).

\(^{52}\)1985 WL 1625 (1985).

\(^{53}\)\textit{Id.} at 1.

\(^{54}\)\textit{Id.} at 2 (internal citations omitted).

\(^{55}\)112 F.3d 287 (7th Cir. 1997).

\(^{56}\)\textit{Id.} at 288.

\(^{57}\)\textit{Id.} at 290-91.
been clearly shown that there was “particularized harm to our domestic markets.”  

With ICE we currently have trading by U.S. customers in U.S. denominated currency on U.S. terminals in the foremost benchmark U.S. crude oil futures contracts with substantial evidence demonstrating “particularized harm to our domestic markets.”

Indeed these cases are consistent with a fundamental tenet of federal financial enforcement jurisprudence that federal financial regulatory jurisdiction extends even to wholly foreign transactions when domestic financial markets suffer “from the effects of [an] improper foreign transaction[.]”  

The leading commentators on U.S. derivatives regulation have, accordingly stated: “[E]ven without substantial activity in the United States, jurisdiction will exist when conduct abroad has a substantial affect upon U.S. markets and U.S. investors.”

Confirmation of this broad sweep of U.S. jurisdiction to address overseas malpractices significantly impacting U.S. markets is evidenced most clearly by the Sumitomo case. In that case, the CFTC’s enforcement division reached a settlement agreement with a Japanese corporation upon determining that the Japanese head copper trader of the Sumitomo Corporation manipulated the price of U.S. copper almost exclusively through trading done in London on the London Metals Exchange. The CFTC imposed $150 million in fines and restitution. Only a small portion of the trading was done in the U.S. and the London Metals Exchange contact with the U.S. was limited to a U.S. warehouse. Despite these limited U.S. contacts, “the penalty [assessed was] the largest ever levied by a U.S. Government agency,” and it was widely recognized that the settlement indicated that “manipulation of any commodity traded in the [U.S.] could be the subject of a C.F.T.C. action, even if no acts were committed in this country.”

Clearly, then, trading done on trading platforms within the U.S. would be subject to full CFTC regulatory authority. The fact that ICE is headquartered in Atlanta with its trade matching engines in Chicago and controls through its U.S. terminals over 30% of the lead U.S.-delivered petroleum contract only makes the jurisdictional question that much easier. The same is true of the Dubai exchange that partners with U.S.-based NYMEX to trade WTI contracts on U.S. terminals; and the prospect of NYMEX opening a London trading platform for its energy futures products, but escaping U.S. regulation for that trading through a staff no action letter treating NYMEX as if it were a U.K. entity.

Even more important, Sumitomo and its progeny are an answer to those many threats levied by large U.S. financial institutions that assert, if their trading on “foreign” trading terminals located in the U.S. is regulated, they will simply move that trading abroad. To be

58 Id. at 291.
60 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 51, at 984.
62 Id. at 2-3.
63 Id. at 24-25.
64 Id. at 11-14.
clear, any trading done in the U.S. on foreign exchanges is *a fortiori* covered by the applicable U.S. commodity laws.\(^{66}\) So when the threat is made that the U.S. institutions will trade abroad, it means that it will be done completely outside of the sovereign U.S. However, the *Sumitomo* line of cases make clear that the CFTC, and for that matter, United States Department of Justice for purposes of related criminal prosecution\(^{67}\) can enforce violations of U.S. laws abroad if U.S. markets are significantly impacted by the wrongdoing in foreign countries. In short, speculators cannot escape the reach of U.S. civil and criminal law if they cause price distortions in U.S. commodity markets.

Moreover, as I have testified elsewhere, no exchange, wherever located, can develop liquidity in and maximize profits from trading U.S. delivered futures products without having a substantial U.S. presence.\(^{68}\) This is evidenced by the 18 CFTC staff no action letters issued to foreign exchanges from all over the world allowing the placement of trading terminals in the U.S.\(^{69}\) In short, the threat that trading in U.S. delivered commodities will be done exclusively abroad is idle when confronted by both economic and legal realities.

### The Intercontinental Exchange Cannot Fairly Be Deemed British for Purposes of Trading U.S. Delivered Petroleum Futures in U.S. Dollars on U.S. Trading Terminals

Of course, all of the above jurisdictional analysis assumes that ICE (and DME) are “foreign” boards of trade. While ICE has a London office, that office is controlled by ICE’s headquarters in Atlanta; ICE’s trading engines are in Chicago; it is trading over 30% of the U.S. premier crude oil futures contract in U.S. denominated currency. ICE’s non-petroleum products, i.e., natural gas futures contracts, are clearly traded within U.S. jurisdiction and are subject to regulation under U.S. law by virtue of the Farm Bill’s “End the Enron Loophole” provision.\(^ {70}\) ICE also owns a fully regulated U.S. exchange: formerly the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT); now ICE Futures U.S. It defies all logic that such an exchange can be called “foreign” based on the name given to its subsidiary (ICE Futures Europe) and maintaining a London office that could as easily be operated out of the U.S.

The same is also true of the Dubai Mercantile Exchange. Its principal partner is the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), a U.S. regulated exchange and a U.S. entity. The

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\(^{66}\) JOHNSON & HAZEN, *supra* note 51, at 984.


President of NYMEX sits on DME’s board. DME has authority to trade the U.S. delivered WTI contract on trading terminals in the U.S. Under these circumstances, DME is clearly a U.S. exchange.

The absurdity of the abuse of the FBOT staff no action process is highlighted by recent reports concerning NYMEX. It is widely reported that NYMEX, a U.S. regulated exchange headquartered in the U.S., wants to establish a London futures trading platform that will apply for FSA approval to operate under the United Kingdom’s regulatory regime and then apply for an FBOT staff no action letter to allow trading within the U.S. on its NYMEX London platform. Doubtless WTI will be traded on that platform and NYMEX will then have converted itself from a U.S. entity into a British entity with principal regulation in the hands of the United Kingdom.

And, why should NYMEX not do this? It is following precisely the ICE template. However, the proposal defies all good sense, and, even worse, it will add darkness to the trading markets that affect the price of crude oil, gasoline, and heating oil within the U.S.

Under the ICE, DME and London/NYMEX scenarios, each of these exchanges are clearly U.S. exchanges and their trading terminals should be regulated as U.S. regulated contract markets. Moreover, as U.S. contract markets, they and the traders on those exchanges (no matter whether they trade in the U.S. or abroad) are fully subject to both CFTC civil jurisdiction and United States federal criminal statutes.\(^71\) For example, in *Tamari v. Bache*\(^72\) the Seventh Circuit held there was federal jurisdiction to enforce the Commodity Exchange Act, even though the trader and the trader’s broker accused of fraud were both situated in Lebanon,\(^73\) by stating: “that Congress intended to proscribe fraudulent conduct associated with any commodity future transactions executed on a domestic exchange, regardless of the location of the agents that facilitate the trading” and thus there was jurisdiction.\(^74\)

**The CFTC Has Consistently Viewed Foreign Exchanges Trading on U.S. Terminals Subject to Full U.S. Regulation**

It has been shown above, that as a legal matter there is no bar either within the CEA as now drafted nor within the case law that prevents the CFTC from gaining full regulatory control, not only over any futures trading done in the U.S., but futures trading done anywhere in the world that significantly and adversely impacts U.S. markets. Even if one were to assume that ICE, for example, is truly a foreign board of trade, Section 4 (b) only bars regulation of trading done by foreign citizens in foreign countries trading foreign commodities on foreign exchanges when such trading does not cause substantial dysfunctions to U.S. markets. Below it is shown that this well established law has governed the FBOT staff no action process since its inception.

The staff no action process initiated in 1999 was not developed under a view that, pursuant to Section 4 (b), the CFTC could not regulate foreign exchanges who wished to put trading terminals in the U.S. To the contrary, the history is clear that those foreign exchanges


\(^72\) 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984).

\(^73\) *Id.* at 1104-05.

\(^74\) *Id.* at 1108; JOHNSON & HAZEN, *supra* note 51, at 987.
themselves recognized that, in the absence of an exemption under Section 4 (c) of the CEA, they would have to fully register as a U.S. contract market. As their plain language made clear when they were first issued in 1999, the FBOT no action letters originated from a rulemaking proceeding that, by its very terms, indicated that permission to put terminals in the U.S. derived from Section 4 (c)’s exemption from full regulation and not from Section 4 (b)’s absolute bar against foreign regulation. It must be remembered that Section 4 (b) does not countenance exceptions to its general restriction. The no action letters include a myriad of regulatory conditions on the foreign boards of trade that are completely inconsistent with the absolute bar within Section 4 (b).

If there were any doubt about the above analysis, it was belied by the actions of the CFTC on June 17, 2008, when it added four new conditions to the existing ICE Futures Europe no action letter. While these additional conditions have only been applied to ICE, Acting Chairman Lukken’s related comments show that the CFTC has the authority to incorporate them in the now outstanding 14 other FBOT staff no action letters affecting every foreign board of trade with U.S. terminals, as well as any FBOT that seeks an exemption in the future.

As the proposed rules explained, Section 4(c) of the Act provides the Commission with authority "by rule, regulation, or order" to exempt "any agreement, contract or transaction" from the requirements of Section 4(a) of the act if the Commission determines that the exemption would be consistent with the public interest, that the contracts would be entered into solely by appropriate persons and that the exemption would not have a material adverse effect on the ability of the Commission or any contract market to discharge its regulatory or self-regulatory duties under the Act. Id. (internal citations omitted).

Among the conditions present in all of the no action letters are the following: the exchange will satisfy the appropriate designation in its home jurisdiction, the exchange must work to ensure fair markets that prohibit fraud and other abuses by providing adequate supervision, continued adherence to IOSCO Principles for Oversight of Screen-Based Trading Systems for Derivative Products, members and guaranteed customers will only receive direct access if a clearing member guarantees and assumes all financial liability, there are sufficient safeguards to prevent unauthorized access or trading, at the Commission’s request recipients will provide market information including access to books and records, and will submit all contracts to be made available through the no-action process, the volume of said trades and a list of names and addresses of all those using these exchanges.


See LIFFE Administration & Management, CFTC No-Action Letter, 1999 CFTC Ltr. LEXIS 38, 4-5 (July 23, 1999); Access to Automated Boards of Trade (proposed rules), 64 Fed. Reg. 14,159, 14,174 (Mar. 24, 1999). As the proposed rules explained, Section 4(c) of the Act provides the Commission with authority "by rule, regulation, or order" to exempt "any agreement, contract or transaction" from the requirements of Section 4(a) of the act if the Commission determines that the exemption would be consistent with the public interest, that the contracts would be entered into solely by appropriate persons and that the exemption would not have a material adverse effect on the ability of the Commission or any contract market to discharge its regulatory or self-regulatory duties under the Act. Id. (internal citations omitted).


Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Conditions Foreign Access on Adoption of Position Limits on London Crude Oil Contract (June 17, 2008) available at http://www.cftc.gov/newsroom/generalpressreleases/2008/pr5511-08.html (last visited June 19, 2008). As Acting Chairman Lukken stated, These new conditions for foreign access will provide the CFTC with additional oversight tools to monitor linked contracts. This powerful combination of enhanced trading data and additional market controls will help the CFTC in its surveillance of regulated domestic exchanges, while preserving the important benefits
4 (b)’s absolute prohibition were applicable to FBOTs with U.S. terminals, as some have argued as a predicate to limited legislative or administrative action in this area, how could the CFTC add these new conditions to the outstanding no action letters? Those new conditions, _inter alia_, require large trader reporting and the imposition of speculation limits. 80 The failure of the FBOTs to comply could result in the revocation of the no action letters, thereby requiring each FBOT to register as a fully regulated U.S. contract market. 81

Those who would attempt to limit Congressional and regulatory controls on ICE, DME, and NYMEX/London have also found comfort in a November 2006 policy statement issued by the CFTC on the FBOT no action letter process. 82 Much is made that Section 4 (b) is cited and quoted therein. Whatever the purpose of that reference, the assertion that 4 (b) presents an absolute bar is belied by the following within that policy statement:

>[i]n the absence of no-action relief, a board of trade, exchange or market that permits direct access by U.S. persons might be subject to Commission action for violation of, among other provisions, section 4(a) of the CEA, if it were not found to qualify for the exclusion from the DCM designation or DTEF registration requirement. 83

In short, the failure to gain no action relief would mean that, in the absence of registration as a fully regulated contract market, the FBOT would have to remove its U.S. terminals. As the CFTC expressly stated in its June 17, 2008 letter to ICE imposing the new conditions on its no action status, if ICE satisfies the four new conditions, the CFTC “will not recommend that the Commission institute enforcement action against [ICE] based upon [ICE’s] failure to seek contract market designation or registration as a DTEF under Sections 5 and 5a of the Act”.

Again, the action of the CFTC adding further conditions to the ICE no action letter, including large trader reporting and speculation limits, upon pain of an enforcement proceeding based on the failure to register as a U.S. regulated contract market, clearly demonstrates that the CFTC meant what it said in the above quoted reference from its 2006 policy statement, it has broad powers to require a “foreign” exchange to fully register in the U.S. or terminate its presence in this country. 84 Section 4 (b) provides no impediment to those powers.

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of our international recognition program that has enabled proper global oversight during the last decade. This raises the bar for all future foreign access requests and will ensure uniform oversight of linked contracts. 85

81 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
82 Boards of Trade Located Outside of the United States and No-Action Relief from the Requirement to Become a Designated Contract Market or Derivatives Transaction Execution Facility, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,443 (Nov. 2, 2006).
83 Id. at 64,445 n.23.
Efforts Designed to Oversee and Improve the Foreign Regulation of U.S. Delivered Futures on U.S. Terminals May Not Effectively Close the “London/Dubai” Loophole

On June 12, 2008, S. 3130, the “Increasing Transparency and Accountability in Oil Prices Act of 2008” was introduced. S. 3130 ratchets up the CFTC’s oversight of foreign boards of trade energy futures contracts on U.S. trading terminals (“FBOTs”), but leaves primary and direct enforcement and oversight in the hands of the foreign regulator, e.g., the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the case of ICE.

It is my understanding that S. 3130’s deference to the primacy of foreign regulators to oversee U.S. terminals operated by FBOTs in the U.S. emanates from a concern that section 4 (b) of the Act bars U.S. regulation of even those FBOTs in the U.S. As has been shown above, section 4 (b), whatever it means, is an absolute bar to regulation. Because S. 3130 increases the existing CFTC regulation of FBOTs, it would run afoul of the absolute bar in Section 4 (b) if that provision did apply to U.S. trading terminals. However, as shown above, section 4 (b)’s bar only applies to foreign trades on foreign exchanges of foreign commodities not having a significant impact on U.S. markets. Therefore, policy concerns about section 4 (b) should not govern the regulation of FBOT terminals in the U.S., especially when those terminals trade U.S. delivered futures contracts; and even more especially when the FBOTs institutional ties are so closely affiliated with the U.S. and U.S. institutions that the FBOT loses all claim to foreign status.

S. 3130 is a major improvement of what had been the CFTC’s oversight of FBOTs’ U.S. terminals. However, perhaps because of concerns about the impact of Section 4 (b), this legislation is not as comprehensive, for example, as the 2008 PUMP Act discussed above.

S. 3130 affords the CFTC the authority to enforce the prohibitions of section 9 of the Act, concerning criminal penalties, including anti-manipulation prohibitions therein, and “to limit, reduce, or liquidate any position” on the FBOT in aid of preventing, inter alia, manipulation and excessive speculation enforcement. Impostion of restrictions on the FBOT, however, must be preceded by consultation with the FBOT's foreign regulator.

86 S. 3130’s other provisions would increase CFTC enforcement staff; make the Inspector General of the CFTC independent of the CFTC Chairman; and have the Comptroller General complete a study within 120 days of the international practices for regulating energy commodity markets. See id. at §§ 3-5. The legislation also calls upon the CFTC to collect data on index traders and swaps dealers activities in the energy markets to insure. See id. at § 8. The data collection is designed to reexamine hedging exemptions granted to swaps dealers in these markets so as to free them from speculation limits. Unlike the 2008 PUMP Act, S. 3130 does not afford the CFTC direct jurisdiction regarding over-the-counter swaps trading and index funds, which are now excluded from regulation by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
87 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
88 See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
89 See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
90 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
91 See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
92 See S. 3130 at §7.
93 See id.
The CFTC “may apply such recordkeeping requirements [to the FBOT] as the Commission determines are necessary,” and before the CFTC exempts an FBOT from full U.S. contract market regulatory requirements, it must ensure that the FBOT operating the U.S. terminals “appl[y] comparable principles” to those of the CFTC for “daily publication of trading information and position limits or accountability levels for speculators” and provides to the CFTC “the information that the [CFTC] determines necessary to publish a Commitment of Traders report” for U.S regulated contract markets.

S. 3130 requires the CFTC to conduct a review of FBOT no action status for existing FBOTs between the first anniversary of the passage of S. 3130 and one and one half years thereafter to ensure FBOT compliance with the new statutory requirements imposed by this legislation. This provision creates an ambiguity that may lead to the conclusion that the requirements of S. 3130 would not be enforced until this review takes place beginning one year after enactment.

In sum, S. 3130 requires the CFTC to ensure that FBOTs develop large trading reporting and speculation limits, and that they collect such other data as the CFTC deems necessary. The CFTC can bring enforcement actions for, inter alia, manipulation after consulting with the foreign regulator.

For all other purposes, S. 3130 leaves in place the foreign regulator as having direct oversight and enforcement responsibility for the supervision of the FBOTs’ terminals within the U.S. for those many matters that fall short of manipulation, e.g., insuring that the foreign exchange has an aggressive surveillance infrastructure. Therefore, as will be shown below, critically important aspects of U.S. contract market regulation, especially the power to intervene directly in markets when emergencies exist so as to, e.g., adjust margins and position limits, will not be applied to the FBOT U.S. terminals trading U.S. delivered energy futures contracts.

In any event, recent actions taken by the CFTC to increase regulation of ICE put the requirements of S. 3130 in a new context.

**CFTC’s New Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Boards of Trade with U.S. Terminals**

For at least two years prior to May 20, 2008, the CFTC had repeatedly assured Congress and market participants that the dramatic rise in crude oil, natural gas, gasoline, heating oil, and agricultural products is caused exclusively by supply/demand market fundamentals. The CFTC had based its conclusions on its “exhaustive” research of all relevant market data.

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94 Id.
95 Id. at §6.
96 Id. at §11.
98 See infra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
Indeed, as recently as May 20, 2008, before the full Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, the CFTC’s Mr. Harris, testified: “[A]ll the data modeling and analysis we have done to date indicates there is little economic evidence to demonstrate that prices are being systematically driven by speculators in these [agriculture and energy] markets....[O]ur comprehensive analysis of the actual position data of these traders fails to support [the] contention” that there is excessive speculation or manipulation.101 Rather, he said “prices are being driven by powerful economic fundamental forces and the laws of supply demand.”102

In a rather dramatic about face, the CFTC suddenly announced on May 29, 2008 (or just nine days after Mr. Harris testimony) that that agency is in the midst of an investigation into the crude oil energy markets103 and it will now begin to collect substantial amounts of new data to determine what is undergirding high oil prices.104 This reversal in course is almost certainly the product of intense pressure placed on the CFTC by Congress to ensure that excessive speculative activity and perhaps even manipulation is not being conducted on the principal market over
which the CFTC has declined primary responsibility, i.e., trading done on ICE and on ICE’s U.S. terminals.\textsuperscript{105}

As crude oil and gas prices continued to spike even after the CFTC’s May 29, 2008, announcement, the pressure on the CFTC did not let up.\textsuperscript{106} Thus, by June 17, 2008, the CFTC once again ratcheted up pressure on ICE.

In a dramatic June 17, 2008 letter to ICE, the CFTC Director of Market Oversight referenced the fact that ICE had moved its trading platform from London “to the ICE Platform operated by [ICE] in Atlanta, Georgia,” and that that U.S. platform was now trading three U.S. delivered energy futures products (WTI, heating oil, and gasoline) “each of which is cash-settled on the price of physically-settled contracts traded on NYMEX.”\textsuperscript{107} Most importantly, the June 17 letter to ICE then stated:

A foreign board of trade listing for trading a contract which settles on the price of a contract traded on a CFTC-regulated exchange raises very serious concerns for the Commission. . . . In the absence of preventive measures at [ICE], this circumstance could compromise the [CFTC’s] ability to carry out its market surveillance responsibilities, as well as the integrity of prices established on CFTC-regulated exchanges. . . . [T]he division retains the authority to condition further, modify, suspend, terminate, or otherwise restrict the terms of the no-action relief provided herein, in its discretion.\textsuperscript{108}

In order to address the CFTC’s “very serious concerns” that it had “compromise[d] [its own] ability to carry out its market surveillance responsibilities, as well as the integrity of the prices established” thereon, the letter then outlined four new conditions that it imposed upon ICE: “position limits or position accountability levels (including related hedge exemption provisions) as adopted by” U.S. regulated contract markets; quarterly reports of any member

\textsuperscript{105} See Letter from Twenty-Two Senators to Walter Lukken, Acting Chairman, CFTC (May 23, 2008), available at http://cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=298325 (last visited June 21, 2008) (insisting that CFTC require ICE to demonstrate why it should not be subject to the same regulation as other U.S.-based exchanges and warning, “[a]bsent expeditious Commission action, Congress may need to step in to protect consumers and ensure that all markets trading U.S. delivered energy futures are transparent and free of fraud, manipulation, and excessive speculation”); Letter from Senator Jeff Bingaman to Walter Lukken, Acting Chairman, CFTC (May 27, 2008), available at http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=0fdd0eb4-4b1d-49f0-a3a2-f89fd0e4b1d3&Month=5&Year=2008&Party=0 (last visited June 21, 2008) (expressing concern that that “the Commission’s assertions to date -- discounting the potential role of speculation in driving up oil prices -- have been based on a glaringly incomplete data set” and demanding an explanation of many CFTC activities); Energy Speculation: Is Greater Regulation Necessary to Stop Price Manipulation?: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Rep. Joe Barton, Member, House Subcomm. on Investigations) (informing Walter Lukken, Acting Chairman, CFTC, that Congressed had empowered FERC to provide additional regulation in some energy markets because they were displeased with the CFTC’s efforts).

\textsuperscript{106} See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text; Press Release, Senator Cantwell, Senators Cantwell and Snowe Demand Intercontinental Exchange Reveal Names Behind Record Oil Prices (June 12, 2008), available at http://cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=299072 (last visited June 22, 2008) (demanding that Acting CFTC Chairman Lukken receive information directly from ICE pursuant to its no action letter).


\textsuperscript{108} Id.
exceeding those levels and limits; publication of daily trading information comparable to that required of U.S. contract markets; daily reporting of “large trader positions” as provided by U.S. regulated markets.\(^\text{109}\)

ICE was given 120 days to come into compliance with the new CFTC conditions.\(^\text{110}\) The CFTC acknowledged that the new ICE rules would have to be approved by the FSA.\(^\text{111}\) The June 17 letter to ICE concludes by stating that only if ICE complies with the conditions outlined therein can ICE be assured that the CFTC will “not recommend that the Commission institute enforcement action against [ICE] or its members” based on ICE’s failure to register as a U.S. regulated contract market.\(^\text{112}\)

On June 17, 2008, the day that that letter to ICE was released, CFTC Acting Chairman Lukken is reported to have told the Senate oversight committee: "The CFTC will also require other foreign exchanges that seek such direct access to provide the CFTC with comparable large trader reports and to impose comparable position and accountability limits for any products linked with US regulated futures contracts[.]

Much of what the CFTC has done implements the data collection requirements required of FBOTs by S. 3130. Indeed, the CFTC’s threat of enforcement authority against ICE in its June 17, 2008 letter, while limited for these purposes to failing to register as a U.S. regulated contract market, would seem to make it clear that that agency could enforce all civil and criminal penalties asserted throughout the CEA against ICE and its members if appropriate, thereby possibly even exceeding the grant of section 9 enforcement powers afforded the CFTC with regard to FBOTs in S. 3130.

As will be shown below, however, Congress would be well advised to use the full force of its powers to bring ICE and similar “foreign” exchanges with trading terminals in the U.S. under complete U.S. regulatory control.

**The CFTC’s New Regulatory Approach for FBOT U.S. Terminal Trading Falls Short of What Is Needed to Drive Excessive Speculation from U.S. Energy Futures Markets**

With regard to the CFTC’s June 17, 2008 actions towards ICE, there is much to be skeptical about. No sooner was the ink dry on the CFTC letter to ICE than the CFTC enforcement director, who is well into the seventh month of an investigation on this matter and has yet not collected much needed data, publicly proclaimed at a gathering of foreign traders in Stockholm, “we have no evidence that speculators in ICE WTI contracts are manipulating markets.”\(^\text{114}\) Substantial bipartisan concern was expressed to Acting Chairman Lukken, on the day the letter was sent to ICE calling for more information, that he and the agency were at least

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\(^{109}\) Id. at 3.

\(^{110}\) Id.

\(^{111}\) Id.

\(^{112}\) Id.


\(^{114}\) John Rega & Matthew Leising, *Regulator Says No Evidence Speculators Manipulating Oil Futures*, BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2008).
giving the appearance of pre-judging the outcome of the investigation by expressing doubts about its merits. The skepticism about the bona fides of the investigation is understandable given the agency’s stance up to May 20 that a comprehensive review of the evidence had already been completed and had demonstrated that the oil futures market was being driven exclusively by supply/demand fundamentals.

Second, there appears to be a lack of urgency in the CFTC’s actions. The terms of the ICE no action letter granting U.S. terminal presence with UK regulation expressly provides that the CFTC may obtain trading data directly from ICE. Yet, the June 17, 2008 letter affords ICE 120 days to provide trader data and then it only appears to call for prospective information, i.e. no data will be afforded of the skyrocketing escalation of this last year. The gasoline crisis today has reached emergency proportions for both American industry and the American public; 120 days is a virtual lifetime in this turbulent economic environment.

It would therefore seem that legislation must be passed to assure rapid oversight of ICE and any other FBOT trading U.S. delivered energy futures products on U.S. terminals. The question then arises: should the U.S. continue to regulate FBOT trading of U.S. delivered energy products on U.S. terminals principally through foreign regulators while requiring more aggressive CFTC oversight of that process as is true of S. 3130? Or, should trading of U.S. delivered energy products on U.S. terminals be deemed a sufficient nexus to the U.S. to require direct U.S. supervision as is directly required by the 2008 PUMP Act?

The Lack of Emergency Authority to Intervene in Market Distortions. The most substantial risk in following the CFTC policy of leaving ICE and other similarly situated “foreign” exchanges under the principal supervision of foreign regulators at the same time those exchanges have U.S. terminals trading critically important U.S. delivered energy products is that


116 Written Testimony of Professor Michael Greenberger, Lessons from Enron: An Oversight Hearing on Gas Prices and Energy Trading: Hearing Before the United States Senate Policy Committee (2006), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=cong_test (last visited June 21, 2008) (explaining that ICE’s no action letter provides that the CFTC can, “obtain directly from ICE on a regular basis trading data pertaining to the oil markets”); IPE, CFTC No-Action Letter, 1999 CFTC Ltr. LEXIS 152, 64 n.64 (Nov. 12, 1999) (stating that “IPE will provide directly to the Commission information necessary to evaluate the continued eligibility of IPE or its members for the relief, to enforce compliance with the terms and conditions of that relief, or to enable the Commission to carry out its duties under the CEA and Commission regulations.”).

117 Written Testimony of James C. May, President of the Air Transport Association, CFTC Energy Markets Oil Futures Contracts Oversight: Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government (2008), available at http://www.airlines.org/government/testimony/ATA+Testimony++CFTC+Energy+Markets+Oil+Futures+Contracts+Oversight.htm (last visited June 21, 2008). Mr. May indicated that “this country’s airlines expect to lose in the range of $10 billion this year – a loss equal to or greater than the worst year in this industry’s history… High fuel prices are the sole reason.” Id. He concluded, Congress has a choice: stay with the status quo or make the hard decisions. The status quo means continuing to blame high oil prices on the weak dollar and growing demand from China and India. Status quo means forming yet another commission or task force to study the problem and report back in six months. The airlines won’t be around much longer if the status quo wins the day. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, if Congress does not act soon, this country will not have a viable airline industry. Id.
the CFTC cannot exercise its broad emergency authority to intervene immediately when confronted with emergencies and dysfunctions on U.S. regulated contract markets. "118

Described as the CEA’s “most potent tool,” section 8a (9) provides that “whenever [the CFTC] has reason to believe that an emergency exists,” it may take such actions “including, but not limited to “the setting of temporary emergency margin levels on any futures contract [and] the fixing of limits that may apply to a market position.”119 An “emergency” is defined:

“to mean, in addition to threatened or actual market manipulations and corners, any act the United states or a foreign government affecting a commodity or any other major market disturbance which prevents the market from accurately reflecting the forces of supply demand for such commodity.”120

It should be born in mind that these emergency powers afford the CFTC the immediate right to alter on a real time basis margin requirements and speculation and position limits to deal with crises as they arise “which prevent[] the market from accurately reflecting the forces of supply demand[,]” While section 8(a) (9) affords direct judicial review of orders after they are issued in a federal court of appeals, it does not by its terms require emergency orders to be preceded by notice and an opportunity to be heard, thereby ensuring speedy restoration of normal market processes.121

When one reads this broad power afforded to the CFTC, one could reasonably ask why it has not been used on days such as Friday, June 6, 2008 when the WTI crude oil futures prices rose nearly $11 per barrel in a single day.122 That is best explained by the fact that the only real time market data in the hands of the CFTC on that day was on NYMEX—the fully regulated U.S. exchange with speculation limits in place; perhaps if the CFTC had meaningful ICE data on that day, thereby seeing the entirety of the WTI crude oil market, it might have seen a need to intervene under its emergency authority to impose temporary position limits and margin requirements to cool down what was deemed to be breathtaking volatility.

Of course, even when it receives the ICE data within the next 120 days pursuant to its June 17, 2008 requirements, the CFTC will still not have the authority under the no action letter process to use its emergency intervention powers on ICE even though over 60% of ICE U.S. delivered WTI futures trading is done within our own country. Rather than exercising real time emergency authority, the CFTC will have to once again “negotiate” with the FSA to have that U.K. regulator intervene to deal with, inter alia, ICE WTI trade matching systems located in Chicago, Illinois.

Moreover, relying upon the FSA to intervene on a real time basis for a “major market disturbance” on a U.S. delivered energy futures contract traded on U.S. terminals is as problematic as a matter of policy as it is as a matter of logistics. Unlike the robust emergency authority given by Congress to the CFTC under section 8a (9), the FSA emergency powers have

118 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 51, at 1218.
120 id. (emphasis added).
121 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 51, at 1221-22.
been implemented in a quite lukcluster fashion. While its governing statute affords intervention power, FSA makes clear on its web site that the U.K. has translated any such authority when “major operational disruptions” are detected on ICE, to a “Tripartite Standing Committee” that would convene the “Cross Market Business Continuity Group” (CMBCG) to:

“provide[] a forum for establishing senior-level practitioner views . . . . Its role is advisory: decisions will be for the relevant official or market authorities or for firms themselves either individually or collectively through the agency of the CMBCG. The CMBCG may also have a role in pooling information to help facilitate private sector decisions and workarounds to alleviate pressures on the system.”

This U.K. guidance for sharing “views” and for “pooling information” in an “advisory” capacity to “help facilitate private sector” decisions in London is what the U.S. industrial consumers of crude oil and the U.S. gas consuming public are left to fall back upon when WTI crude oil skyrackets to $150 per barrel by July 4, 2008, as is predicted by Morgan Stanley, one of the founders of ICE. The CFTC’s June 17 imposition of new conditions on ICE do not convert the U.K.’s lackluster emergency responses into the vigorous emergency responses called for by U.S. law.

Indeed, any effort by Congress to insist upon “comparability” on emergency powers is futile. As the Financial Times has so aptly commented on June 20, 2008, the U.K. ’s futures regulator “operates a . . . system of ‘credible deterrence’ of wrongdoing by engaging in a dialogue with market participants. Since the FSA’s creation in 1997, it has brought no civil or criminal cases in energy markets.” In stark contrast, as Acting Chairman Lukken recently proudly reported to Congress: “[s]ince December 2002 to the present time, the [CFTC] has filed a total of 39 enforcement actions charging a total of 64 defendants with violations involving the energy markets,” having referred “35 criminal actions concerning energy market misconduct” to the Department of Justice.

The contrast between FSA and CFTC enforcement activity in the energy futures markets under their control is quite remarkable, especially since ICE is responsible for nearly 50% of all

125 Tim Paradis, Stocks decline in jobs data, surge in oil prices, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 6, 2008), available at http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5gHs5OM3gFG_DytQQZFbWfPT08MAD914K0H80 (last visited June 21, 2008). Goldman Sachs, also one of the founders of ICE, has predicted that the price per barrel of crude oil will surpass $200 by October of this year. Neil King Jr. and Spencer Swartz, U.S. News: Some See Oil at $150 This Year --- Range of Factors May Sustain Surge; $4.50-a-Gallon Gas, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2008) at A3; Greenberger, supra note 1, at 7.
crude oil futures contracts traded worldwide and since the CFTC has not had access to meaningful ICE data.\footnote{128}{Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., Annual Report Form (10-K) at 63 (Dec. 31, 2007) available at http://www.secinfo.com/dsVsf.tU7.htm (last visited June 22, 2008) (showing that ICE’s total crude oil futures market share is 47.8%).}

The American gas consuming public’s trust in the FSA might also be shaken by the U.K.’s response to the June 17, 2008 CFTC announcement of the imposition of new transparency requirements on ICE’s use of U.S. terminals used as a critical part of ICE’s control of over 30% of the U.S. delivered WTI contract. Mr. Stuart Fraser, head of policy at the City of London Corporation, is reported in the \textit{Financial Times} to have called the CFTC June 17 letter “American imperialism,” and adding for measure “if a bunch of [S]enators want to get rude about the FSA, that’s fine, but don’t interfere in \textit{our} market.”\footnote{129}{Jeremy Grant, \textit{Storm over push for regulatory reform on positions at ICE}, \textit{FINANCIAL TIMES} (June 20, 2008) (emphasis added), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a00c6a00-3e62-11dd-b16d-0000779fd2ac.html (last visited June 21, 2008).}

Of course, the UK is wrong to think trading on U.S. terminals of the U.S. WTI contract is “their” market. ICE is U.S. owned, operated in Atlanta with trading terminals and engines in the U.S. and trading over 30% of U.S. delivered crude oil futures market in U.S. dollar denominated currency.

However, one could easily see how those officials in the U.K. might mistakenly view WTI trading on U.S. terminals as “their” market when the CFTC and ICE continue to refer to this self evidently “U.S.” market as being conducted on a “foreign” exchange. If the CFTC were to flatly state the obvious, \textit{i.e.}, ICE is wholly a U.S. concern, having brought the corpus of the old British International Petroleum Exchange, for all intents and purposes, to the U.S., the UK might grasp the reality of the situation, rather than the ICE perpetuated “London” myth.

\textbf{Deferring to Foreign Regulators Undercuts the Self Regulatory and Surveillance Requirements of U.S. Law.} Next to the inability to exercise the extraordinary emergency powers afforded the CFTC to oversee its markets by deferring to the foreign regulators to supervise U.S. delivered energy futures products on U.S. trading terminals, the most serious problem with the CFTC’s June 17, 2008 deference to FSA is that agency’s sacrifice of the substantial self regulation and surveillance provided by U.S. regulated contract markets to assist U.S. regulators in policing futures markets.

The “core principles” within the CEA that must be followed by an approved U.S. regulated contract market emphasize the importance having those markets serve as the first line of defense for the CFTC in detecting fraud, manipulation, excessive speculation, and other unlawful trading malpractices.\footnote{130}{7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(2)-(6) (2008); (2) (compliance with rules); (3) (contracts not readily subject to manipulation); (4) (monitoring of trading); (5) (position limits); (6) (emergency authority); 7 U.S.C. § 7a(d)(2)-(3) (2008); (2) (compliance with rules); (3) (monitoring of trading).} Without aggressive self-policing of the entirety of the regulated U.S. futures markets, the CFTC simply cannot do its job.
The seriousness with which U.S. regulated markets take their statutorily mandated self-policing and surveillance role is evidenced by NYMEX’s “standards and safeguards” concerning trade and market surveillance. For example, NYMEX makes clear:

Market surveillance is required under CFTC regulations. Each day, the compliance staff compiles a profile of participants, identifying members and their customers holding reportable positions. In addition, daily surveillance is performed to ensure that Exchange prices reflect cash market price movements, that the futures market converges with the cash market at contract expiration, and that there are no price distortions and no market manipulation. . . .

As to trade surveillance, NYMEX provides:

Compliance department analysts are trained to spot instances of misconduct, including “front running” or trading ahead of a customer; wash or accommodation trading (transactions creating the appearance of trading activity, but which have no real economic effect); prohibited cross trading (trading directly or indirectly with a customer except under very limited circumstances, or matching two customer orders without offering them competitively); prearranged trading; and non-competitive trading.\(^\text{132}\)

NYMEX reports that it has \$6.5 million budget for oversight market surveillance with an enforcement staff of \(\geq 40\) personnel.

No detailed analysis of ICE’s self-regulatory and surveillance system is required. Suffice it to say, that for all of ICE’s worldwide markets which are accessible by the U.S. trading terminals, including the U.S. WTI contract, reports are that ICE employs no more than ten individuals on its surveillance staff, i.e., a staff that is one quarter the size of NYMEX. This staff monitors trading of a host of ICE contracts, including those contracts which control over 47% of the world crude oil futures.\(^\text{133}\) Of course, for those energy futures trades ICE executes under the Enron Loophole (because those trades do not derive from the old-IPE), such as the critical Henry Hub U.S. delivered natural gas futures contract, ICE, as of now, has no self-regulation or surveillance system.

Moreover, leaving ICE’s paltry surveillance resources to the side, the principal regulator to which the CFTC is deferring to oversee directly over 30% of U.S. delivered WTI contracts, the U.K.’s FSA, has only “two full time supervisors,” monitoring all of the ICE contracts under their jurisdiction.\(^\text{134}\) Again, this includes 47% of world’s energy futures contracts.

In sum, even though the CFTC has ratcheted up ICE’s regulatory obligations by adding large trader reporting and speculation limits to the WTI trading, it defers to the FSA for the remainder of the oversight of ICE. In effect, the CFTC has surrendered emergency authority to intervene when there are market dysfunctions to impose temporary margin requirements and


\(^{132}\) Id.

\(^{133}\) See supra note 127 and accompanying text.

\(^{134}\) Grant, supra note 125.
position limits; and it has sacrificed its “eyes and ears” on these markets by depending upon ICE’s meager self-policing and surveillance.

In a time of economic distress for American industry and the American consumer caused by skyrocketing energy prices, this country cannot afford to outsource authority to the UK to oversee trading on 30% of our own U.S. delivered crude oil futures contracts, much of which is consummated on U.S. based trading terminals and all of which is trade matched in Chicago, Illinois.

Finally, it bears repeating that during last summer’s subprime mortgage crisis, Northern Rock PLC, one of the U.K.’s largest banks, was required to borrow billions of dollars from the U.K.’s central bank. After news of the bailout was released to the public, thousands of customers wary of losing their savings stood in long lines for several days outside of Northern Rock’s branches to withdraw deposits. With Northern Rock on the brink of collapse, the FSA provided over $100 billion in loans to the bank and in February 2008, the British government finally was required to nationalize it. In March 2008, FSA published an internal report stating that its regulation of Northern Rock "was not carried out to a standard that is acceptable," and highlighted its own failure to provide adequate supervision, oversight, and resources.

This episode, maybe more than any other, reveals that Congress cannot afford to outsource oversight of trading on U.S. terminals of the most important futures contract in determining the price of oil, gasoline, and heating oil. As demonstrated above, Congress has the full authority to pass legislation placing those U.S. terminals under U.S. regulatory control.

Threats that the U.S. reassertion of regulatory control over trading within the U.S. will drive trading overseas are undercut by the reality of every major futures foreign exchange having set up shop in the U.S.; and by the well documented law described above that even a foreign trader in a foreign country who illegally disrupts U.S. markets is subject to the full force and effect of that law.

Finally, contrary to the assertion of the City of London Corporation, this is not a “British” market; it is a U.S. market principally being traded in the U.S. by a trading entity controlled by a U.S. corporation. The economic distress now being suffered by Americans over high energy products cannot be placed in the hands of foreign governments when those products are traded here and have such a huge impact on our economy.

139 See Castle, supra note 136.
140 See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text.